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Chapter 1
Introduction
Understanding spreading processes in complex networks and designing control strategies to contain them
are relevant problems in many different settings, such as epidemiology and public health [4], computer
viruses [23], information propagation in social networks [44], or security of cyberphysical networks [73]. In
this chapter, we describe a bio-inspired framework for optimal allocation of resources to prevent spreading
processes in complex cyber-physical networks. Our motivation is inspired by recent advancement on the
problem of containing epidemics in human contact networks. The most popular dynamic epidemic
model is the Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) model [1, 35]. In this model, a given population is
divided into two compartments. The first compartment, called ‘Susceptible’ (S), contains individuals
who are healthy, but susceptible to becoming infected. The second compartment is called ‘Infected’
(I) and contains individuals who are infected and able to recover from the disease. Individuals can
transition from S to I as they become infected, and from I to S as they recover. In addition to the
SIS model, there are many other models able to model more realistic spreading processes. This is
often done by adding extra compartments representing a variety of disease stages. There are many
works that analyze different variations of the SIS model, such as extensions to higher number of disease
states [76, 21, 39, 58, 59, 10, 32], or explicit modeling of birth and mortality rates [30, 45]. Stability
results are obtained in [40, 41, 45] using Lyapunov analysis, or in [31] using Volterra integral models.
In the literature, we find several approaches to model spreading mechanisms in arbitrary contact
networks. The analysis of this question in arbitrary (undirected) contact networks was first studied by
Wang et al. [84] for a Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) discrete-time model. In [22], Ganesh et al.
studied the epidemic threshold in a continuous-time SIS spreading processes. In both continuous- and
discrete-time models, there is a close connection between the speed of the spreading and the spectral
radius of the network (i.e., the largest eigenvalue of its adjacency matrix) [79]. Designing strategies to
contain spreading processes in networks is a central problem in public health and network security. In
this context, the following question is of particular interest: given a contact network (possibly weighted
and/or directed) and resources that provide partial protection (e.g., vaccines and/or antidotes), how
should one distribute these resources throughout the network in a cost-optimal manner to contain the
spread? This question has been addressed in several papers. Cohen et al. [18] proposed a heuristic
vaccination strategy called acquaintance immunization policy and proved it to be much more efficient
than random vaccine allocation. In [7], Borgs et al. studied theoretical limits in the control of spreads
in undirected network with a non-homogeneous distribution of antidotes. Chung et al. [17] studied a
heuristic immunization strategy based on the PageRank vector of the contact graph. In the control
systems literature, Wan et al. proposed in [81, 82] a method to design control strategies by allocating
heterogeneous resources in undirected networks. In [67], the authors present an spectral analysis of
proximity random graphs with applications to virus spread. In [26], the authors study the problem
of minimizing the level of infection in an undirected network using corrective resources within a given
budget. In [61] a linear-fractional optimization program was proposed to compute the optimal investment
on disease awareness over the nodes of a social network to contain a spreading process. In particular,
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we will cover in detail the work in [65, 66, 64, 69], where the authors developed a convex formulation to
find the optimal allocation of protective resources in a network. An analysis of greedy control strategies
and worst-case conditions was presented in [87]. Recent extensions include the analysis of more general
epidemic models [52], competing diseases [16, 85, 50], time-switching networks [53, 57, 55], and non-
Poissonian spreading and recovery rates [54, 56] have been recently developed. A novel data-driven
optimization framework has also been recently proposed by Han et al. in [28]. A distributed framework
for optimal allocation of resources has also been proposed in [70]. A novel analysis of epidemic models
in arbitrary graphs using tools from positive systems can be found in [38].
In this Chapter, we describe an optimization-based framework to find the optimal allocation of
protection resources in weighted and directed networks of nonidentical agents in polynomial time. In our
study, we consider two types of containment resources:
• Preventive resources able to protect (or ‘immunize’) nodes against the spreading (such as vaccines
in a viral infection process). This type of resources are allocated in nodes and/or edges of the
network before the spread has reached them, so that this element is protected from the spread.
The effect of this resource is to reduce the rate in which the spread can reach this element.
• Corrective resources able to neutralize the spreading after it has reached a node (such as antidotes
in a viral infection). Notice that, in contrast with preventive resources, corrective resources are
used after the spread has reached a node in the network. The effect of this type of resource is to
increase the rate of recovery of an elements after the spread has reached it.
In the framework herein presented, we assume there are cost associated with these resources and
study the problem of finding the cost-optimal distribution of resources throughout the network to contain
the spreading. The aforementioned protection resources have an associated cost that depends on the
level of protection achieved by the resource. For example, the larger the investment on vaccines and
antidotes, the higher the level of protection achieved by the population in which the resources have been
distributed. One of the main questions in epidemiology and public health is to find the optimal allocation
of preventive and corrective resources to contain an epidemic outbreak in a cost-optimal manner. An
identical question can be asked in the context of designing protection strategies for other cyber-physical
networks, motivating the main problem covered in this chapter:
Problem. Find the cost-optimal allocation of preventive and corrective resources to protect a cyber-
physical network against spreading processes.
In the field of systems reliability, there is a well-developed theory of preventive and corrective main-
tenance for single components or machines, but there is a lack of a theoretical framework to analyze
large-scale interdependent systems [71]. The state-of-the-art in the reliability analysis of networked sys-
tems is mostly based on Markov models [33, 72, 71, 20]. These models usually suffer from scalability
issues, since the state space grows exponentially fast with the number of components under considera-
tion. Similar Markov models have also been proposed in the analysis of disease spreading in networked
populations. A rich and growing literature is arising in this context, proposing a variety of approaches
to find efficient allocation of protection resources to contain an epidemic outbreak. In a series of papers,
Preciado et al. developed a mathematical framework, based on dynamic systems theory and convex op-
timization, to find the optimal distribution of protection resources in a complex network [63, 65, 62, 68].
In particular, they showed that it is possible to find the cost-optimal distribution of vaccines and anti-
dotes in a (possibly weighted and directed) social network of nonidentical nodes in polynomial time using
geometric programming [66]. This framework has also be extended to find the allocation of traffic-control
resources to find the cost-optimal traffic profile in a transportation network to contain the spread of a
disease among cities [64].
1.1 Mathematical Framework
We introduce notation and preliminary results needed in our derivations. In the rest of the paper,
we denote by Rn+ (respectively, Rn++) the set of n-dimensional vectors with nonnegative (respectively,
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positive) entries. We denote vectors using boldface letters and matrices using capital letters. I denotes
the identity matrix and 1 the vector of all ones. < (z) denotes the real part of z ∈ C.
1.1.1 Graph Theory
A weighted, directed graph (also called digraph) is defined as the triad G , (V, E ,W), where (i) V ,
{v1, . . . , vn} is a set of n nodes, (ii) E ⊆ V × V is a set of ordered pairs of nodes called directed edges,
and (iii) the function W : E → R++ associates positive real weights to the edges in E . By convention,
we say that (vj , vi) is an edge from vj pointing towards vi. We define the in-neighborhood of node
vi as N ini , {j : (vj , vi) ∈ E}, i.e., the set of nodes with edges pointing towards vi. We define the
weighted in-degree (resp., out-degree) of node vi as degin (vi) ,
∑
j∈N ini W ((vj , vi)) (resp., degout (vi) ,∑
j∈Nouti W ((vj , vi))); in other words, the weighted degrees are the sum of the edge weights attached to
a node.
The adjacency matrix of a weighted, directed graph G, denoted by AG = [aij ], is a n×n matrix defined
entry-wise as aij = W((vj , vi)) if edge (vj , vi) ∈ E , and aij = 0 otherwise [5]. Given a n × n matrix
M , we denote by v1 (M) , . . . ,vn (M) and λ1 (M) , . . . , λn (M) the set of eigenvectors and corresponding
eigenvalues of M , respectively, where we order them in decreasing order of their real parts, i.e., < (λ1) ≥
< (λ2) ≥ . . . ≥ < (λn). We call λ1 (M) and v1 (M) the dominant eigenvalue and eigenvector of M . The
spectral radius of M , denoted by ρ (M), is the maximum modulus of an eigenvalue of M .
In this paper, we only consider graphs with positively weighted edges; hence, the adjacency matrix
of a graph is always nonnegative. Conversely, given a n × n nonnegative matrix A, we can associate
a directed graph GA such that A is the adjacency matrix of GA. Finally, a nonnegative matrix A is
irreducible if and only if its associated graph GA is strongly connected.
In our derivations, we use Perron-Frobenius lemma, from the theory of nonnegative matrices [49]:
Lemma 1.1.1. (Perron-Frobenius) Let M be a nonnegative, irreducible matrix. Then, the following
statements about its spectral radius, ρ (M), hold:
( a) ρ (M) > 0 is a simple eigenvalue of M ,
( b) Mu = ρ (M) u, for some u ∈ Rn++, and
( c) ρ (M) = inf
{
λ ∈ R : Mu ≤ λu for u ∈ Rn++
}
.
Remark 1.1.1. Since a matrix M is irreducible if and only if its associated digraph GM is strongly
connected, the above lemma also holds for the spectral radius of the adjacency matrix of any (positively)
weighted, strongly connected digraph.
Corollary 1.1.2. Let M be a nonnegative, irreducible matrix. Then, its eigenvalue with the largest
real part, λ1 (M), is real, simple, and equal to the spectral radius ρ (M) > 0.
1.1.2 Stochastic Spreading Model in Arbitrary Networks
We formulate the simplest version of the problem under consideration using a generalization of the SIS
model, popularly used to model spreading dynamics in networks, such as the propagation of diseases in a
networked population [42, 14, 79] or malware in a compute network [36, 37, 83, 24]. This generalization
of the SIS model, called Heterogeneous Networked SIS model (HeNeSIS), is a continuous-time networked
Markov process in which each node in the network can be in one out of two possible states, namely,
susceptible or infected. In the context of systems reliability, each node in the networked Markov process
represents a component in a networked infrastructure, and the susceptible and infected states correspond
to operational and faulty states of these components, respectively. Over time, each node vi ∈ V in the
networked Markov process can change its state according to a stochastic process parameterized by (i)
the edge propagation rate βij , and (ii) its node recovery rate δi. In what follows, we shall describe the
dynamics of the HeNeSIS model.
The dynamics of the HeNeSIS model can be described as follows. The state of node vi at time t ≥ 0 is
a binary random variable Xi (t) ∈ {0, 1}. The state Xi (t) = 0 (resp., Xi (t) = 1) indicates that node vi is
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Figure 1.1: Networked Markov process with 2 states per node, corresponding to the HeNeSIS spreading
model. Infected (resp., susceptible) nodes are plotted in red (resp., blue).
in the susceptible (resp., infected) state. We define the vector of states as X (t) = (X1 (t) , . . . , Xn (t))
T
.
The state of a node can experience two possible stochastic transitions:
(i) Assume node vi is in the susceptible state at time t. This node can switch to the infected state
during the time interval [t, t+ ∆t) with a probability that depends on: (i) the propagation rates{
βij , for j ∈ N ini
}
, and (iii) the states of its in-neighbors
{
Xj (t) , for j ∈ N ini
}
. Formally, the
probability of this transition is given by
Pr (Xi(t+ ∆t) = 1|Xi(t) = 0, X(t)) =
∑
j∈N ini
βijXj (t) ∆t+ o(∆t), (1.1)
where ∆t > 0 is considered an asymptotically small time interval.
(ii) Assuming node vi is infected, the probability of vi recovering back to the susceptible state in the
time interval [t, t+ ∆t) is given by
Pr(Xi(t+ ∆t) = 0|Xi(t) = 1, X(t)) = δi∆t+ o(∆t), (1.2)
where δi > 0 is the curing rate of node vi.
In the context of failure propagation in networked infrastructure, βij represents the Poisson rate at
which a failure in the element located at node vj propagates to the element in node vi. Similarly,
δi represents the Poisson rate at which a fault at component vi is cleared. This HeNeSIS model is
therefore a continuous-time Markov process with 2n states in the limit ∆t → 0+. Unfortunately, the
exponentially increasing state space makes this model hard to analyze for large-scale networks. Using
the Kolmogorov forward equations and a mean-field approach [79], one can approximate the dynamics
of the spreading process using a system of n ordinary differential equations, as follows. Let us define
pi (t) , Pr (Xi (t) = 1) = E (Xi (t)), i.e., the probability of node vi being infected (or faulty) at time t.
Hence, the Markov differential equation [77] for the state Xi (t) = 1 is the following,
dpi (t)
dt
= (1− pi (t))
n∑
j=1
βijpj (t)− δipi (t) . (1.3)
Considering i = 1, . . . , n, we obtain a system of nonlinear differential equation with a complex dynamics.
In the following, we derive a sufficient condition for the spreading process to die out exponentially
fast. Let us define the vector p (t) , (p1 (t) , . . . , pn (t))T , and the matrices BG , [βij ], D , diag (δi).
Notice that BG is the weighted adjacency matrix of a weighted, directed graph with edge-weight function
W (vj → vi) = βij ; in other words, the weights of the directed link from vj to vi is βij . The ODE under
consideration presents an equilibrium point at p∗ = 0, called the disease-free (or fault-free) equilibrium.
A stability analysis of this ODE around the equilibrium provides the following stability result [65]:
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Proposition 1. Consider the nonlinear HeNeSIS model in (1.3) and assume βij , δi > 0. Then, if the
eigenvalue with largest real part of BG −D satisfies
< [λ1 (BG −D)] ≤ −ε, (1.4)
for some ε > 0, the disease-free equilibrium (p∗ = 0) is globally exponentially stable, i.e., ‖p (t)‖ ≤
‖p (0)‖K exp (−εt), for some K > 0.
1.2 A Quasiconvex Framework for Optimal Resource Allocation
Assume that the fault propagation and recovery rates, βij and δi, are adjustable by allocating protection
resources on the edges and nodes of the networked Markov process. We consider two types of protection
resources: (i) preventive resources (e.g., vaccinations in the case of disease spreading), and (ii) corrective
resources (e.g., antidotes). We assume that the propagation rate βij can be reduced using preventive
resources. Also, allocating corrective resources at node vi increases the recovery rate δi. We assume
that we are able to, simultaneously, modify the fault propagation and recovery rates of vi within feasible
intervals 0 < β
ij
≤ βij ≤ β¯ij and 0 < δi ≤ δi ≤ δ¯i < ∆, where ∆ is an uniform upper bound in the
achievable recovery rate, which is assumed to be known a priori. The particular values of βij and δi
depend on the amount of preventive and corrective resources allocated at node vi. We consider that
protection resources have an associated cost. We define two cost functions, the prevention (or vaccination)
cost function fij (βij) and the correction (or antidote) cost function gi (δi), that account for the cost of
tuning the fault propagation and recovery rates to βij ∈
[
β
ij
, β¯ij
]
and δi ∈
[
δi, δ¯i
]
, respectively.
In this context of protection design, one can study a type of resource allocation problems, called
the budget-constrained allocation problem. In the budget-constrained problem we are assigned a total
budget C to invest on protection resources and we need to find the best allocation of preventive and/or
corrective resources to maximize a measure of the network resilience. In [65] and [66], the authors
proposed a measure of the network resilience based on the norm of the vector of probabilities of fault
probabilities, ‖p (t)‖. In particular, the exponential rate of decay of such a vector is a measure of the
ability of the networked infrastructure to recover from random failures. In other words, assuming that
we are able to control the system to satisfy the condition ‖p (t)‖ ≤ ‖p (0)‖K exp (−εt), the exponential
decay rate ε measures the ability of the networked infrastructure to ‘self-heal’ from random contingencies.
Based on Proposition 1, the decay rate of an epidemic outbreak is determined by ε in (1.4). Thus,
given a budget C, the budget-constrained allocation problem is formulated as follows:
Problem 1. (Budget-constrained allocation) Given the following elements: (i) A directed network G =
(V, E) representing failure dependencies between components in a networked infrastructure, (ii) a set of
cost functions fij (βij),gi (δi), (iii) bounds on the fault propagation and recovery rates 0 < βij ≤ βij ≤ βij
and 0 < δi ≤ δi ≤ δi, and (iv) a total budget C, find the cost-optimal distribution of (preventive and
corrective) protection resources to maximize the exponential decay rate ε.
Based on Proposition 1, we can state this problem as the following optimization program:
maximize
ε,{βij}(j,i)∈E ,{δi}ni=1
ε (1.5)
subject to < [λ1 (BG −D)] ≤ −ε, (1.6)∑
(j,i)∈E
fij (βij) +
∑
i∈V
gi (δi) ≤ C, (1.7)
β
ij
≤ βij ≤ βij , (j, i) ∈ E ; δi ≤ δi ≤ δi, i ∈ V, (1.8)
where (1.7) is the budget constraint.
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In the following section, we propose an approach to find the optimal budget-constraint allocation in
polynomial time for weighted and directed contact networks, under certain convexity assumptions on
the cost functions fij and gi.
1.2.1 A Geometric Programming Approach
We propose a convex formulation to solve the budget-constrained in weighted, directed networks using
geometric programming (GP) [9]. Geometric programs are a type of quasiconvex optimization problems
that can be easily transformed into convex programs and solved in polynomial time. We start our
exposition by briefly reviewing some concepts used in our formulation. Let x1, . . . , xn > 0 denote n
decision variables and define x , (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn++. In the context of GP, a monomial h(x) is defined
as a real-valued function of the form h(x) , dxa11 xa22 . . . xann with d > 0 and ai ∈ R. A posynomial
function q(x) is defined as a sum of monomials, i.e., q(x) ,
∑K
k=1 ckx
a1k
1 x
a2k
2 . . . x
ank
n , where ck > 0.
Posynomials are closed under addition, multiplication, and nonnegative scaling. A posynomial can be
divided by a monomial, with the result a posynomial.
A geometric program (GP) is an optimization problem of the form (see [8] for a comprehensive
treatment):
minimize f(x) (1.9)
subject to qi(x) ≤ 1, i = 1, ...,m,
hi(x) = 1, i = 1, ..., p,
where qi are posynomial functions, hi are monomials, and f is a convex function in log-scale
1. A GP is
a quasiconvex optimization problem [9] that can be transformed to a convex problem. This conversion
is based on the logarithmic change of variables yi = log xi, and a logarithmic transformation of the
objective and constraint functions (see [8] for details on this transformation). After this transformation,
the GP in (1.9) takes the form
minimize F (y) (1.10)
subject to Qi (y) ≤ 0, i = 1, ...,m,
bTi y + log di = 0, i = 1, ..., p,
where Qi (y) , log qi(exp y) and F (y) , log f (exp y). Also, assuming that hi (x) , dixb1,i1 x
b2,i
2 . . . x
bn,i
n ,
we obtain the equality constraint above, with bi , (b1,i, . . . , bn,i), after the logarithmic change of vari-
ables. Notice that, since f (x) is convex in log-scale, F (y) is a convex function. Also, since qi is a
posynomial (therefore, convex in log-scale), Qi is also a convex function. In conclusion, (1.10) is a
convex optimization problem in standard form and can be efficiently solved in polynomial time [9].
To solve Problem 1 using GP, it is convenient to define the ‘complementary’ recovery rate δ̂i , ∆−δi.
We can also define a ‘complementary’ recovery cost function as ĝi
(
δ̂i
)
, gi (δi) = gi
(
∆− δ̂i
)
; in other
words, instead of defining the recovery cost in terms of the recovery rate, δi, we define it in terms of its
complementary value, δ̂i. Hence, Problem 1 can be formulated as a GP if the cost functions fij (βij) and
ĝi
(
δ̂i
)
are posynomials (see [8], Section 8, for a treatment about the modeling abilities of monomials and
posynomials). Therefore, the total cost function
∑
(j,i)∈E fij (βij) +
∑
i∈V ĝi
(
δ̂i
)
is also a posynomial.
In [66], Problem 1 is transformed into a GP, using results from the theory of nonnegative matrices and
the Perron-Frobenius lemma. The resulting formulation is described below [66]:
Theorem 2. Consider the following elements:
(i) A directed graph G = (V, E) representing failure dependencies in a networked infrastructure.
1Geometric programs in standard form are usually formulated assuming f (x) is a posynomial. In our formulation, we
assume that f (x) is in the broader class of convex functions in logarithmic scale.
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(ii) Posynomial cost functions {fij (βij)}(j,i)∈E and
{
ĝi
(
δ̂i
)}
i∈V
.
(iii) Bounds on the failure propagation and recovery rates 0 < β
ij
≤ βij ≤ βij and 0 < δi ≤ δi ≤ δi < ∆.
(iv) A maximum budget C to invest in protection resources.
Then, the optimal allocation of protection resources on edge (vj , vi) is given by fij
(
β∗ij
)
and the optimal
allocation of recovery resources at node vi is gi
(
∆− δ̂∗i
)
, where β∗ij,δ̂
∗
i are the optimal solution of the
following GP:
minimize
λ̂,{βij}(j,i)∈E ,{ui,δ̂i}i∈V
λ̂ (1.11)
subject to
n∑
j=1
βijuj + δ̂iui ≤ λ̂ui, (1.12)∑
(j,i)∈E
fij (βij) +
∑
i∈V
ĝi
(
δ̂i
)
≤ C, (1.13)
β
ij
≤ βij ≤ βij , (j, i) ∈ E ; ∆− δi ≤ δ̂i ≤ ∆− δi, i ∈ V, (1.14)
It is easy to verify that the above formulation is a GP; hence, it can be efficiently transformed into
a convex optimization program and solved in polynomial time, [66]. The tools presented are illustrated
with a numerical simulation involving the world-wide air transportation network.
1.2.2 Controlling Epidemic Outbreaks in a Transportation Network
We apply the above results to the design of a cost-optimal protection strategy against epidemic outbreaks
that propagate through the air transportation network [74]. We analyze real data from the world-wide
air transportation network and find the optimal distribution of vaccines and antidotes to prevent the viral
spreading of an epidemic outbreak. We consider the budget-constrained problems in our simulations.
We limit our analysis to an air transportation network spanning the major airports in the world, in
particular, we consider only airports having an incoming traffic greater than 10 million passengers per
year (MPPY). There are 56 such airports world-wide and they are connected via 1, 843 direct flights,
which we represent as directed edges in a graph. To each directed edge (i, j), we assign a ‘contact’ weight,
aji, equal to the number of passengers taking that flight throughout the year
2 (in MPPY units).
In this problem, we assume that allocating preventive resources (e.g. vaccines) at a particular airport,
scale down the propagation rate of all the incoming links in proportion to the incoming traffic. In other
words, we assume that βij = βiaij , where aij is the number of passengers per year (in MPPY) that
travel from airport vj to airport vi, and βi is a scaling factor that depends on the destination airport
only. In our simulations, we consider the following cost functions fij (βij) = f (βi) and gi (δi) = g (δi),
where f and g are the following functions (plotted in Figure 1.2):
fi (βi) =
β−1i − β¯−1i
β−1
i
− β¯−1i
, gi (δi) =
(1− δi)−1 − (1− δi)−1(
1− δi
)−1 − (1− δi)−1 . (1.15)
Notice that as we increase the amount invested on vaccines, the propagation rate of that node is reduced
from β¯i to βi (red line). Similarly, as we increase the amount invested on antidotes at a node vi, the
recovery rate grows from δi to δ¯i (blue line). Notice that both cost functions present diminishing marginal
benefit on investment.
2Although we could have chosen other functions of the traffic to design these contact weights, we illustrate our framework
using this simple set of weights. Using a different, possibly nonlinear functions, to generate these weights do not influence
the tractability of our framework.
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Figure 1.2: Propagation rate (in red, and multiplied by 20, to improve visualization) and recovery rate
(in blue) achieved at node vi after an investment on protection (in abscissas) is made on that node.
Using the air transportation network and the cost functions specified above, we solve the budget-
constrained allocation problem using the geometric programs in Theorems 2. In the left subplot of Figure
1.3, we present a scatter plot with 56 circles (one circle per airport), where the abscissa of each circle is
equal to g (δ∗i ) and the ordinate is f (β
∗
i ), namely, the investments on allocation of vaccines and antidotes
on the airport at node vi, for all vi ∈ V. We observe an interesting pattern in the allocation of preventive
and corrective resources in the network. In particular, we have that in the optimal allocation some
airports receive only corrective resources (indicated by circles located on top of the x-axis), and some
airports receive a mixture of preventive and corrective resources. In the center and right subplots in Fig.
1.3, we compare the distribution of resources with the in-degree and the PageRank3 centralities of the
nodes in the network [51]. In the center subplot, we have a scatter plots where the ordinates represent
investments on prevention (red +’s), correction (blue x’s), and total investment (the sum of prevention
and correction investments, in black circles) for each airport, while the abscissas are the (weighted)
in-degrees4 of the airports under consideration. We again observe a nontrivial pattern in the allocation
of investments for protections. In particular, for airports with incoming traffic less than 4 MPPY, only
corrective resources are needed. Airports with incoming traffic over 4 MPPY receive both preventive and
corrective resources. In the right subplot in Fig. 1.3, we include a scatter plot of the amount invested on
prevention and correction for each airport versus its PageRank centrality in the transportation network.
We observe that there is a strong correlation between the network centrality measures and the level
of investment per node. In particular, there is an almost affine relationship between the total level of
investment (black circles in Fig. 1.3, center) and the incoming traffic of an airport. Furthermore, there is
a clear piece-wise linear affine relationship between the levels of investment on prevention and correction
(Fig. 1.3, left). Similar relationships also hold when comparing the levels of investment versus the
Page-Rank centralities in the airport network (Fig. 1.3, right).
Notice that the above distribution of protection resources correspond to the particular cost functions
chosen for our simulations. Changes in these cost functions allow us to observe interesting phenomena
in the optimal distribution of protection resources, such as airports with a zero protection assignment
at optimality, or a distribution of resources with a negative correlation with centrality measures. For
example, it is possible to build cases in which nodes with low centrality (e.g. nodes with low incoming
traffic and PageRank) are assigned at optimality a higher level of protection than more central nodes
3The PageRank vector r, before normalization, can be computed as r = (I − αAGdiag(1/degout (vi)))−11, where 1 is
the vector of all ones and α is typically chosen to be 0.85.
4It is worth remarking that the in-degree in the abscissa of Fig. 1.3 accounts from the incoming traffic into airport vi
coming only from those airports in the selective group of airports with an incoming traffic over 10 MPPY. Therefore, the
in-degree does not represent the total incoming traffic into the airport.
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Figure 1.3: Results from the budget-constrained allocation problem. From left to right, we have (a) a scatter
plot with the investment on correction versus prevention per node, (b) a scatter plot with the investment on
protection per node and the in-degrees, and (c) a scatter plot with the investment on protection per node versus
PageRank centralities.
[86].
1.3 Towards a General Framework for Network Protection
The framework presented in this chapter has been recently extended in several directions. In what
follows, we briefly describe the following extensions: (i) a generalized framework to cover more realistic
epidemic models (beyond SIS), (ii) a novel data-driven framework able to handle network uncertainties,
and (iii) an analysis tool that allows us to study non-Poissonian transmission and recovery rates.
1.3.1 Generalized Epidemic Models
In Nowzari et al. [52, 12], the authors recently studied a model of spreading, called the Generalized
Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Vigilant (G-SEIV) model, that generalizes many of the models in the liter-
ature, including SIS, SIR, SIRS, SEIR, SEIV, SEIS, and SIV [60, 30]. This model has two two infectious
states, called Infected (I) and Exposed (E), that allow us to model human behavioral changes. An in-
dividual is in the Exposed state if she is infected and contagious, but not yet aware that she is sick
(i.e., in an asymptomatic incubation period). Individuals in the Infected are infected and aware of the
disease, which induces a different behavior. For instance, a person knowingly infected with a disease
may have much less contact with others, yielding less chance of spreading the infection. The dynamics
of this model is described below. The G-SEIV model also includes a Vigilant (V) state, which represents
healthy individuals being aware of the disease being spread. Hence, individuals in the Vigilant state are
more careful in their social contacts and less likely to be infected.
Let us denote by [Si(t), Ei(t), Ii(t), Vi(t)]
T
the probability vector associated with node i being in
each one of these states: Susceptible, Exposed, Infected, or Vigilant, respectively. Using a mean-field
approximation, the dynamics of the G-SEIV model can be described as:
S˙i(t) = γiVi(t)− θiSi(t)− Si(t)
 ∑
j∈N ini
βEi Ej(t) + β
I
i Ij(t)

E˙i(t) = Si(t)
 ∑
j∈N ini
βEi Ej(t) + β
I
i Ij(t)
− εiEi(t)
I˙i(t) = εiEi(t)− δiIi(t) (1.16)
V˙i(t) = δiIi(t) + θiSi(t)− γiVi(t).
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Figure 1.4: Generalized Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Vigilant model in a network of individuals. (Source
of figure: [52]).
Using nonlinear analysis techniques, Nowzari et al. derived the following necessary and sufficient
condition for the disease to die out exponentially fast:
Theorem 1.3.1. (Conditions for stability of disease-free equilibrium) The disease-free equilib-
rium of the G-SEIV model is globally exponentially stable if and only if the following matrix,
Q =
[
TBEAG − E TBIAG
E −D
]
. (1.17)
is Hurwitz, where BE = diag
(
βE
)
, BI = diag
(
βI
)
, D = diag (δ) , E = diag (ε) , T = diag
(
γ
θ+γ
)
The above result can be used to mitigate, or eliminate completely, the spreading of the disease.
In [52], the authors considered three types of resources are available to control the disease: corrective
resources (e.g., antidotes), preventative resources (e.g., vaccines), and preemptive resources (e.g., aware-
ness campaigns and/or limiting traffic). Under mild conditions on the cost functions of these resources,
the authors were able to bound the rate of spreading of the undesired disease.
1.3.2 Data-Driven Allocation
Although current vaccination strategies assume full knowledge about the network structure and spreading
rates, in most practical applications, this information is only partially known. To elaborate on this point,
let us consider the following setup. Assume that each node in the network represents subpopulations
(e.g., city districts) connected by edges that are determined by commuting patterns between districts.
In practice, one can use traffic information and geographical proximity to infer the existence of an
edge connecting districts. For example, in Fig. 1.5, we represent such a network for those districts
in West Africa affected by the 2014 Ebola outbreak. On the other hand, it is very challenging to use
this information to estimate the contact rates between subpopulations. Inspired by this example, we
considered in [28] a networked SIS model taking place in a contact network of unknown contact rates. To
extract information about these unknown rates, we assumed that we have access to time series describing
the evolution of the spreading process observed from a collection of sensor nodes during a finite time
interval.
In contrast to current network identification heuristics, in which a single network is identified to
explain the observed data, the authors in [28] developed a robust optimization framework in which
an uncertainty set containing all networks that are coherent with empirical observations is defined.
This characterization of the uncertainty set of networks is tractable in the context of conic geometric
programming, recently proposed by Chandrasekaran and Shah [15]. In this context, the authors were able
to efficiently find the optimal allocation of resources to control the worst-case spread that can take place
in the uncertainty set of networks. In order to extract information about the contact rates, the authors
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Figure 1.5: Network of districts in West Africa affected by the 2014 Ebola outbreak. (Source: WHO)
considered two different sources of information that are usually available in epidemiological problems.
These sources can be classified as (i) prior information about the network topology and parameters
of the disease, and (ii) empirical observations about the spreading dynamics. In particular, one can
consider the following pieces of prior information:
(i) Assume that the sparsity pattern of the contact matrix BG is given, although its entries are un-
known. This piece of information may be inferred from geographical proximity, commuting pat-
terns, or the presence of transportation links connecting subpopulations.
(ii) Assume that upper and lower bounds on the spreading rates associated to each edge, i.e., βij ∈[
β
ij
, βij
]
, for all (i, j) ∈ E , are available. This could be inferred from traffic densities and subpop-
ulation sizes.
(iii) In practice, each district contains a large number of individuals. Therefore, one can use the average
recovery rate in the absence of vaccination as an estimation of the nodal recovery rate. We denote
this ‘natural’ recovery rate by δ0i , and assume it to be known.
Apart from these pieces of prior information, the authors in [28] also assumed that they had access to
partial observations about the evolution of the spread over a finite time interval. In particular, assume
that we observe the dynamics of the disease for t ∈ [0, T ] from a collection of sensor nodes VS ⊆ V.
Based on these pieces of information, one can define an uncertainty set that contains all contact matrices
BG consistent with both empirical observations and prior knowledge. This set contains those contact
matrices BG such that the transmission rates {βij} are consistent with the disease dynamics.
In order to eradicate the disease at the fastest rate possible, the authors in [28] considered the
following control problem:
Problem 3. (Data-driven optimal allocation) Assume the following pieces of information about a viral
spread are given:
(i) prior information about the state matrix (as described in P1–P3);
(ii) a finite (and possibly sparse) data series representing partial evolution of the spread over a set of
sensor nodes VS ⊆ V during the time interval t ∈ [T ] (i.e., D in (??));
(iii) a set of vaccine cost functions gi for all i ∈ VC , and a range of feasible recovery rates
[
δci , δ
c
i
]
such that 1− δ0i = δ
c
i ≥ δci ≥ δci > 0;
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(iv) a fixed budget C > 0 to be allocated throughout a set of control nodes in VC ⊆ V, so that∑
i∈VC gi(δ
c
i ) ≤ C.
Find the cost-constrained allocation of control resources to eradicate the disease at the fastest possible
exponential rate, measured as ρ(M(BG ,dc)), over the uncertainty set ∆BG of contact matrices coherent
with prior knowledge and the observations in D.
From the perspective of optimization, Problem 3 is equivalent to finding the optimal allocation of
resources to minimize the worst-case (i.e., maximum possible) decay rate ρ(M(BG ,dc)) for all BG ∈ ∆BG .
In Han et al. [28], a robust optimization framework was developed to solve this problem, even in the
presence of sparse observations.
1.3.3 Non-Poissonian Rates
The vast majority of spreading models over networks assume exponentially distributed transmission and
recovery rates. In contrast, empirical observations indicate that most real-world spreading processes do
not satisfy this assumption [48, 47, 46]. For example, the transmission rates of human immunodeficiency
viruses present a distribution far from exponential [6]. In the context of online social networks, empirical
studies show that the rate of spreading of information follow (approximately) a log-normal distribution
[43, 78].
There are only a few results available for analyzing spreading processes over networks with non-
exponential transmission and recovery rates. The experimental study in [80] confirmed the dramatic
effect that non-exponential rates can have on the speed of spreading, as well as on the epidemic threshold.
In [34], an analytically solvable (although rather simplistic) model of spreading with non-exponential rates
was proposed. An approximate criterion for epidemic eradication over graphs with general transmission
and recovery times based on asymptotic approximations was proposed in [13].
In the recent work [54, 56], the authors propose an alternative approach to analyze general transmis-
sion and recovery rates using phase-type distributions. In particular, they derive conditions for disease
eradication using transmission and recovery times that follow phase-type distributions (see, e.g., [2]).
The class of phase-type distributions is dense in the space of positive-valued distributions [19], hence, it
can be used to theoretically analyze arbitrary transmission and recovery rates. Furthermore, there are
efficient algorithms to compute the parameters of a phase-type distributions to approximate any given
distribution [2]. The key tool in this analysis is a vectorial representations proposed in [11], which can
be used to represent phase-type distributions.
1.4 Comparisons with Common Heuristics
Usual approaches to distribute protection resources in a network of agents susceptible to cascade failures
are heuristics based on network centrality measures [51]. As in the optimal framework presented in the
previous section, much of the literature uses a bio-inspired epidemic models when studying harmful pro-
cess with the ability to spread between interconnected agents. The main idea behind heuristic protection
strategies is to rank agents according to different measures of importance based on their location in the
network and greedily distribute protection resources based on each agents rank. For example, Cohen
et al. [18] proposed a simple protection strategy called acquaintance immunization policy in which the
most connected node of a randomly selected node is given protective resources. This strategy was proved
to be much more efficient than random allocation of protective resources. Hayashi et al. [29] proposed
a simple heuristic called targeted immunization consisting on greedily choosing nodes with the highest
degree (number of connections) in scale-free graphs. Chung et at. [17] studied a greedy heuristic pro-
tection strategy based on the PageRank vector of the contact graph. Tong et al. [75] and Giakkoupis et
al. [25] proposed greedy heuristics based on protecting those agents that induce the highest drop in the
dominant eigenvalue of the contact graph. Recently, Prakash et al. [3] proposed several greedy heuris-
tics to contain harmful cascades in directed networks when nodes can be partially protected (instead of
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completely removed, as assumed in previous work). These heuristics, as those in [75, 29], are based on
eigenvalue perturbation analysis.
The heuristic methods in the literature are designed for a single resource type, predominantly the
protective resources. A simplified variant of the budget-constrained allocation problem is presented with
only protection-type resources in order to compare the optimal solution with heuristic solutions.
Problem 4. The Network Protection Problem is given by
max
β,ε
ε
s.t. <[λ1(BA− δI)] ≤ −ε
n∑
i=1
f(βi) ≤ C
β ≤ βi ≤ β¯ ∀i ∈ V.
1.4.1 Greedy, Centrality Based Strategies
Definition 1.4.1. Extract the effective objective in Problem 4 which is induced by the epigraph
form. Define
ε(β) = −<[λ1(BA− δI)] (1.18)
where B = diag(β) for any feasible resource allocation β.
Monotonicity and continuity of the function ε(β) guarantee that fixing any feasible β and maximizing
over ε always causes the constraint <[λ1(BA− δI)] ≤ −ε to become tight. At the optimal point (β∗, ε∗)
of Problem 4 satisfies
ε∗ = −<[λ1(diag(β∗)A− δI)].
When solving the resource allocation β, ε(β) is treated as the effective objective in Problem 4.
Definition 1.4.2. Define the efficiency of a feasible resource allocation β as
Q(β) =
ε(β)− ε(β¯)
ε(β∗)− ε(β¯) ∈ [0, 1] (1.19)
where β∗ is a resource allocation achieving the maximum in Problem 4.
The effective objective ε(β) and the costs functions f(βi) are monotonically non-increasing in the
resource allocations βi at each node, therefore β¯ trivially achieves the minimum over the set of feasible
resource allocations β.
Definition 1.4.3. Let v be a centrality vector. Given a budget sufficient to completely protect k nodes:
C = kf(β), the greedy protection strategy β̂v is to completely protect k nodes with the highest values
in v. Define the protection fraction: r = k/N where N = n+m is the the total number of nodes.
Common centrality measures used for heuristics are degree and eigenvector centrality, [29]. Page rank
centrality is used as in place of eigenvector centrality in the case of general digraphs, [17]. While Page
rank depends on a parameter α, we drop the α from our notation because our results hold for the whole
family of Page rank vectors generated by non-trivial choices of α ∈ (0, 1).
Theorem 1.4.1. Given the Network Protection Problem defined in Problem 4, with budget C, there
exists a network G satisfying
Q(β̂DEG) = Q(β̂PR) = 0
where r ∈ (0, 1) is the fraction of nodes that can be fully protected.
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Sn
Cm
n-node empty network
all edges from Sn to Cm
are present
m-node directed cycle
Figure 1.6: We construct the network G to
prove theorem 1.4.1.
Theorem 1.4.1 is based on a worst case graph construc-
tion as shown in Fig. 1.6. Define the subgraph Cm as an m
node directed cycle, Sn as an n node empty network and the
there are edges from all nodes i ∈ Sn to all nodes j ∈ Cm.
Formally, the edge set is given by
(i, j) ∈ E if any of
 i ∈ Sn, j ∈ Cmi, j = i+ 1 ∈ Cm
i = m+ n, j = n+ 1 ∈ Cm
(1.20)
and in all other cases (i, j) 6∈ E . All weights are given by
W(i, j) = 1 for (i, j) ∈ E . Given a vaccination fraction r,
the size of the subgraphs Cm and Sn must satisfy m > n+ 2
and rN < n in order to generate a network for which greed
heuristics have zero efficiency. Such m and n exist for any
r ∈ (0, 1) but the networks required become very large as
r → 1.
The weakly connected network G results in a spreading
process dominated by the nodes in Cm even though nodes
in Sn have larger centralities. A generalization of Theorem
1.4.1, which builds a strongly connected network with arbi-
trarily small efficiency can be found in [86].
Remark 1.4.1. The proof of Theorem 1.4.1 makes use of a constructive example for the centrality
measures which identify nodes which are the most likely to fail: (a) out degree and (b) Page rank with a
random walk defined as moving up the edges. If one uses centrality measures which identify nodes which
would be the most potent seeds such as (c) in degree or (d) Page rank computed using a random walk
that flows down the edges, one can construct an alternative G by simply reversing the direction of the
edges from Sn to Cm. Using this alternative network, one can reproduce Theorem 1.4.1 for (c) and (d).
1.4.2 Greedy Heuristics and Workstation Protection
Network A
1 2 3
4
6 5
78
9
Network G
1 2 3
6
4 5
78
9
Figure 1.7: Network G with vertices S3 = {1, 2, 3} and
C6 = {4, 5, . . . , 9} satisfies the conditions for the counter
example network defined in Theorem 1.4.1. In Network
A the subgraph on C6 is relaxed to be less structured for
demonstration purposes.
Consider a simple application in which such a
worst case network might arise naturally: nodes
are computers belonging to individuals in a work
environment. Edges indicate access to files on an-
other persons computer.
Each workstation in Cm is an element in the cy-
ber layer, paired with one or more plants in the
physical layer. Workstations in Sn exist only in
the cyber layer and belong to a group of adminis-
trators who can access files on all workstations in
Cm.
Workers have limited access to each others files,
but do not have access to files on the administra-
tor’s computers. A virus may spread when an un-
infected computer accesses an infected computer.
It is assumed that an infected workstation cannot
adequately control its associated plant which leads
to physical layer failures. Protection resources
take the form of antivirus software with updates
on a variable time interval, software updated more frequently providing a smaller infection rate β but
updates incurring a greater cost f(β). The cost function
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Network A (Cm = Undirected Network) Network G (Cm= Directed Cycle)
strategy 
profile β
convergence 
rate ε
Efficiency
Legend
No Allocation Out Degree 
Allocation
Total Degree 
Allocation
Page Rank 
Allocation
Sym Page Rank 
Allocation
Optimal 
Allocation
No Allocation Out Degree 
Allocation
Total Degree 
Allocation
Page Rank 
Allocation
Sym Page Rank 
Allocation
Optimal 
Allocation
node 1 (Sn) 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.5
node 2 (Sn) 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.5
node 3 (Sn) 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.5
node 4 (Cm) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0261 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0196
node 5 (Cm) 0.5 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.0174 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0196
node 6 (Cm) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0261 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0196
node 7 (Cm) 0.5 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.0174 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0196
node 8 (Cm) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0261 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0196
node 9 (Cm) 0.5 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.0131 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0196
- -1.11 -1.11 0.152 -1.11 0.152 0.248 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.28
- 0 0 0.929 0 0.929 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
unstable rate stable rate optimal allocation
Network A (Cm = Undirected Network) Network G (Cm= Directed Cycle)
Centrality 
Measures
Legend
Out Degree 
Centrality
Total Degree 
Centrality
Page Rank 
Centrality
Sym Page Rank 
Centrality
Out Degree 
Centrality
Total Degree 
Centrality
Page Rank 
Centrality
Sym Page 
Rank Centrality
node 1 (Sn) 6 6 0.289 0.093 6 6 0.299 0.122
node 2 (Sn) 6 6 0.289 0.093 6 6 0.299 0.122
node 3 (Sn) 6 6 0.289 0.093 6 6 0.299 0.122
node 4 (Cm) 2 7 0.020 0.105 1 5 0.017 0.106
node 5 (Cm) 3 9 0.023 0.128 1 5 0.017 0.106
node 6 (Cm) 2 7 0.020 0.104 1 5 0.017 0.106
node 7 (Cm) 3 9 0.023 0.128 1 5 0.017 0.106
node 8 (Cm) 2 7 0.020 0.104 1 5 0.017 0.106
node 9 (Cm) 4 11 0.026 0.151 1 5 0.017 0.106
Nodes selected for protection
Figure 1.8: (Top) A variety of centrality measures are used as the basis for greedy algorithms, these measures
are reported for the Networks A and G. (Bottom) The allocation strategies tested are detailed, their exponential
convergence rate bounds ε and their efficiencies are reported for comparison purposes. For the case of the counter
example network G, none of the greedy type algorithms yield a stable convergence rate.
f(βi) =
β( β¯βi − 1)
β¯ − β (1.21)
is chosen to satisfy f(β¯) = 0, f(β) = 1 and f(β) ∝ 1/β. This allows us to choose capacity C equal to
the number of nodes we wish to be able to allocate maximum protection. In our example the infection
rate with outdated anti-virus software is β¯ = .5 while the maximum update rate achieves an infection rate
of β = .01. Choosing a budget of C = 3 for a network with n = 3 and m = 6 (such as in G or A shown
in Fig. 1.7), the fraction of nodes that can be maximally protected is r = 1/3. An infected machine has
recovery rate δ = 0.3, based on curative resources in the form of IT staff, which are uniformly available.
In the example, four heuristic algorithms based on greedily allocating resources with respect to
centrality measures are considered. The centrality measures are out degree, total degree, Page rank with
α = .1 and symmetrized Page rank with α = .1. Symmetrized Page rank is computed by allowing the
random walk move over a directed edge in either direction. The worst case networks are products of
extreme asymmetry between Cm and Sn, the symmetric centrality measure show that even symmetric
centrality measure don’t overcome the potential for arbitrarily poor behavior. In Fig. 1.8 the top table
shows all of the centrality vectors for the example problem in the networks A and G. The network G is the
network constructed in our analytical proofs. The network A is an example of a less structured employee
collaboration network which we include to demonstrate two points: (i) our constructed network G is not
unique and (ii) symmetrizing heuristics are less fragile than heuristics that respect edge direction.
In G and A the out degree and Page rank heuristics allocate all resources to the admins, Sn. This is
ineffective because even though the admins are the most likely to become infected the worker group, Cm
cannot access their files and become infected. Furthermore, the failure of admin workstation does not
lead directly to physical layer failures. Fig. 1.8 (bottom) shows the infection rate profiles generated by
the various heuristics and the optimal solution. A strategy is ineffective if the convergence rate epsilon
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is negative because this corresponds to unstable dynamics, where the computer virus is spreading faster
than the IT staff can repair workstations. The result is a complete failure to consistently control any of
the plants in the physical layer of the system.
1.5 Conclusions
We have studied the problem of allocating protection resources in weighted, directed networks to contain
spreading processes, such as the propagation of viruses in computer networks, cascading failures in
complex technological networks, or the spreading of an epidemic in a human population. We have
considered two types of protection resources: (i) Preventive resources able to ‘immunize’ nodes against
the spreading (e.g. vaccines), and (ii) corrective resources able to neutralize the spreading after it has
reached a node (e.g. antidotes). We assume that protection resources have an associated cost and
have then studied the budget-constrained allocation problem, in which we find the optimal allocation of
resources to contain the spreading given a fixed budget. We have solved this optimal resource allocation
problem in weighted and directed networks of nonidentical agents in polynomial time using Geometric
Programming (GP). Furthermore, the framework herein proposed allows simultaneous optimization over
both preventive and corrective resources, even in the case of cost functions being node-dependent.
We have illustrated our approach by designing an optimal protection strategy for a real air trans-
portation network. We have limited our study to the network of the world’s busiest airports by passenger
traffic. For this transportation network, we have computed the optimal distribution of protecting re-
sources to contain the spread of a hypothetical world-wide pandemic. Our simulations show that the
optimal distribution of protecting resources follows nontrivial patterns that cannot, in general, be de-
scribed using simple heuristics based on traditional network centrality measures.
We then presented the following recent extensions on this work: (i) a generalized framework to cover
more realistic epidemic models, (ii) a novel data-driven framework able to handle network uncertain-
ties, and (iii) an analysis tool that allows us to study non-Poissonian transmission and recovery rates.
We concluded this chapter with a comparison between our results and common heuristics used in the
literature.
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Exercises
Consider the following three networks with n nodes:
Answer the following questions:
Question 1. Compute the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrices of the graphs in figures (a),
(b) and (c) as a function of n.
Question 2. Consider the SIS model of spreading with β = 0.1 and n = 100. For what values of δ
does an epidemics die out in for each one of the three networks above? (Reminder: The epidemic dies
out when λ1 < δ/β).
Question 3. Imagine you work for a health agency responsible for controlling an epidemic taking
place in the above networks. Assume you can tune the spreading rates of the edges within a feasible
interval [β, β]. Assume the cost associated with tuning β is given by fij(β) = 1/β. Write the associated
optimization problem for each one of the above networks. (Hint: Your answer should look like equations
1.5–1.8).
Question 4. Transform the optimization problem in Question 3 into a standard geometric program.
(Hint: Your answer should look like equations 1.11–1.14).
Question 5. Implement the geometric program from Question 4 using MATLAB’s CVX Toolbox [27].
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